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Abstract  
 
This study compares the strength of PPP financing approach in a developed country (United Kingdom) 
and the limitations in a developing country (Nigeria), the largest economy in Africa by GDP. It 
observes the missing gap between the practices and successes of both countries with the aim of 
fostering positive outcomes for PPP in Nigeria. Results from the literature analysis assert the critical 
success factors in the UK as: transparent procurement, quality private consortium, public support, 
strong political support, apt risk allocation, etc. These present clues to be adopted by the Nigerian 
economy in maximizing the PPP approach to infrastructure financing. 
 
Keywords: Infrastructure, Public-Private Partnership, Economic Growth, Systematic Literature 
Review, Developing Economy, Nigeria. 
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 1. Introduction 
 Infrastructure plays a key role as a driver of economic growth and subsequently 
improves the quality of living of a community (Carnis and Yuliawati, 2013). 
Infrastructures are generally defined as facilities required ensuring the smooth 
operation of a society (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2006). In the developing world, 
economic growth has experienced a drag due to lack of infrastructure such as electricity 
generation and distribution, health services and telecommunication networks, amongst 
others (Trebilcock and Rosenstock, 2015). Infrastructure constraints in Africa has been 
observed to explain the approximately two per cent decrease in economic growth per 
annum (Sanusi, 2012).  
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 In developing economies, around one-quarter to one-half of manufacturing 
firms, as compared to 16 per cent of manufacturing firms in OECD countries state that 
lack of sufficient electricity facility is a paramount restriction on business (World Bank, 
2013). Particularly in Nigeria, which has a national poverty level of 46 per cent by head 
count (in 2010), only 20 per cent of the country‘s 193,000km of roads are paved, while 
at the same time, a sizeable number of railways have gone out of place. This lack of 
social amenities is due to inadequate financing as one of its causes. No doubt, 
traditional financing approaches which include multilateral loans, bonds and local 
deposit money banks, amongst others have achieved some form of development both 
in the past and at present. However, for Nigeria to achieve its anticipatory level of 
sustainable growth, other methods of infrastructure financing must be examined, 
considering the ever-increasing risks and costs of financing that come with these 
traditional financing approaches(Sanusi, 2012).   
 Hence the definition of public-private partnership arrangement is discussed. 
Public-private partnership is a working agreement between the public and private sector 
to establish and construct projects or policies that would be conventionally be regarded 
as falling within public sector‘s responsibilities (Webb and Pulle, 2002). Public-private 
partnership method of financing has since been employed in projects such as urban 
rails, bridges and highways amongst many others(Engel, et al., 2010). Many projects 
considered by the government as worthwhile under a full privatisation scheme are often 
not financially attractive enough to the private sector. As a result, the government 
decides to mitigate the associated risks of such projects to make them financially robust 
enough for the private sector (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2006).  
 PPP projects can take several forms and usually last for long period of time.It 
can either be a contract type or it can be based on scheme. PPP contract type include: 
service contract (1-3 years), management contract (3-8 years), lease contract (5-10 
years) and concession contract (10-30 years and above). Projects based on scheme 
include: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), Build-Lease-
Transfer (BLT), Build-Own-Operate (BOO), Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (ROT). While 
‗build‘ involves construction of the infrastructure, rehabilitate means such infrastructure 
only goes through some form of refurbishment, ‗operate‘ implies that the private 
partner takes responsibility for its maintenance and operation. In the circumstances of 
‗own‘, the private partner takes full ownership of the infrastructure for the period of 
time. Hence a contract follows any of the listed patterns. However, concession contracts 
usually take the form of a scheme (De Vera, et al., 2013). Hence, having several 
modals of PPP made PPP quite flexible to be embraced. 
 In a Build-Operate-TransferPPP arrangement, the building of the project is 
financed by a group of private investors, whereby the facilities are then operated and 
managed by the same private investors for about 10, 20 to 30 years, after which these 
assets are handed over to the government at the end of the arrangement.  
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Throughout the operation of a project, compensation is paid to the group of private 
investors to cover both capital outlay referred to as capital expenses (capex), and 
operation expenses (opex). The government obtains the revenue from user fees, which 
are used to pay the private partner. This depends on the type of infrastructure being 
constructed, such as in the case of a toll road where road users are expected to pay 
fees constantly for the use of the amenity(Engel, et al., 2010).  
Figure 1 below summarizes most of the points mentioned above. 
Figure 1: A simple PPP model 
 
Source: Roehrich, et al. (2014) 
 PPPs have been generally classified as first and second generation PPPs. 
According to Akintoye, et al. (2005) and Albouy and Bousba (1998),first generation PPP 
projects are marked as free-standing in nature and are accompanied by evident output 
which are assessed conveniently.Examples of first generation projects include: 
transportation and power plants projects. The primary rationale behind first generation 
PPPs is constraint on traditional public financing which has become the driving factor for 
PPP projects in developing countries.  
 On the other hand, second generation PPPs explore the possibility of the use of a 
PPP model and subsequently include education, healthcare, and several other day-to-
day infrastructures. With the second generation PPP model, value for money becomes 
an underlying reason while complexity in the computation of the Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC) is evident, which was absent in the first generation PPPs (Anvuur 
and Kumaraswamy, 2006).The World Bank (2011) defines public sector comparator as 
a tool employed by a government in identifying the best private investment proposal 
which presents better value for money when compared with the traditional method of 
funding a project.  
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 The hallmark of PPP infrastructure projects is risk sharing, expectedly between 
both the parties involved (Ke, et al., 2010). These risks are shared according to the 
area of strengths of each party or areas where a party has more mitigating techniques 
(Li, et al., 2005). For instance, the public sector is often observed to bear risks 
involving macro-economic stability such as inflation and land acquisition amongst many 
others. The private partners on the other hand often bear risks involved with the 
construction and maintenance of the assets, and also risk associated with finances. 
However, PPPs do not take a straight jacketed form, risk bearing can be shared as 
deemed fit by the public and private sector. 
 The benefits of PPP programmes have been observed in several economies, for 
instance, the involvement by the private sector in building public services has been 
observed to foster high-grade infrastructure investments, especially in countries where 
it has been formalised. Such quality investments have enabled the public sector to 
achieve and raise funds for other more demanding public services(Sanusi, 2012).As a 
result, the turn to PPPis expected to deliver cost-effective projects and equally meet 
budget constraints. In essence, most PPP project decisions are primarily premised on 
value for money (Trebilcock and Rosenstock, 2015). 
 Statistics reveal that globally, PPP investements had increased from a total 
investment of 22.72 billion US dollars in 2004 to 134.2 billion US dollar by 2012  
(Romero, 2015). 
 In this research, public-private partnership‘s strengths and weaknesses are 
compared between a developed country,the United Kingdom, and a developing country, 
Nigeria. The aim and contribution of the paper is to highlight and analyse the critical 
success factors for PPP in the UK, at the same time to investigate the limitations for 
Nigeria, and then propose the ideas by which the utilization of PPP in Nigeria can be 
improved. This paper also contribute to the limited literature and research on PPP in 
Nigeria. 
 The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a background review on 
the PPP infrastructure financing and the motivation for this research. The methodology 
of this paper is to carry out a traditional literature review on the existing limitations to 
the use of PPP in developing countries, particularly Nigeria, which are discuessed in 
section 3. The observed increased in PPP investments over the years in the United 
Kingdom surely has its success factors. Section 4 provides a literature review of these 
critical success factors. Also, in this section, recommendations are highlighted on the  
practical ways in which PPPs can be successfully established in Nigeria. Undoubtedly, 
the United Kingdom has many current arguments against its Private Finance Initiatives 
(PFIs), however that is beyond the scope of this study. The marked difference in the 
success of PPPs in the United Kingdom and Nigeria is conspicuous; hence this study 
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primarily investigates the possible reasons for the already recorded success in PPP in 
the UK and PPP constraints in Nigeria. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
  2. Background 
 There has been a reasonable measure of literature on PPP since the subject 
became a global discussion. Over the past two decades, public-private partnership 
financing approach has been considered in the construction and establishment of 
infrastructure, both in developed and developing economies (Trebilcock and 
Rosenstock, 2015). In 2012, 139 developing countries had already been involved in the 
participation of private sectors in the provision of infrastructure (Chou, et al., 2012). 
 There is empirical evidence regarding the meagre failure rate of PPPs in 
Australia. The success rate of PPPs in Australia has been observed to be around 88 per 
cent of projects over the period 2001-2011 (Regan, et al., 2013). 
 In a larger picture, the proportions of PPP projects funded and completed across 
the world in the period 1985-2004 are shown in figure 2 below. This figure portrays 
that higher success rate has been accomplished in Europe. The lowest report of success 
rate observed is in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Briefly,this indicates a gap 
in PPP achievement of the countries of choice for this study. 
Figure 2: Regional share of PPP projects funded & completed between 1985 & 2004 
 
 Source: Sambrani (2014) 
 In 2011, the whole Asian continent had only recorded 104 infrastructure projects 
completed via PPP, with total investments of approximately 79.38 billion US dollars. In 
India, PPP projects have been observed to have obtained both viability gap and non-
viability gap funding, while China has PPP projects that only obtained non-viability gap 
funding from the government, an example of such projects includes the Chinese 
Zhangbei wind power project which enjoyed subsidized interest payments throughout 
its construction. Viability gap funding (VGF) is a government fiscal policy to enable 
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delivery of infrastructures via PPP arrangements and it is a subtle way of attracting 
private investors because it increases the financial feasibility of a project(Vera, et al., 
2013).   
 Ng and Wong (2006) for instance extensively discussed the possibility of the use 
of non-financial PPPs. Under this circumstance, the private partner is solely responsible 
for the maintenance of the respective infrastructure and subsequently is reimbursed 
after its performance output is being assessed, which is different from the popular 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) as operated in the UK. Nonetheless the non-financial 
PPPs can be adjudged as a form of management contract. An example ofthe use of non-
financial PPPs being employed is found in Hong Kong. 
 Following the earlier study of PPP infrastructure financing approach, Chou and 
Pramudawardhani)(2015) used mean value, confirmatory factor analysis and 
dimensional signifance to establish a comparison between the categories of PPP driving 
factors, critical success factors and risk allocation in Taiwan, Singapore, China, 
Indonesia and the UK, with Indonesia as the baseline. In their study, Chou and 
Pramudawardhani (2015) found no evidence of similarity in the categories analysed 
between PPPs inIndonesia and the United Kingdom, although other evidence of 
similarities were found between Indonesia and countries like China, Singapore and 
Taiwan.  
 Later, Ameyaw and Chan (2015) employed fuzzy synthetic evaluation (FSE) 
approach in examining the riskiness of PPP water supply projects in developing 
economies and concluded that prominent level of riskiness marks PPP water supply 
projects in such countries for both public and private partners.  
 Public-private partnership arrangement for the provision of food and healthcare 
was investigated by Marks (2013) under the subject of institutional challenges in terms 
of corruption, which includes incapacity to enhance regulations and keep track of 
compliance and disregarded institutional priorities amongst others. He argued that 
previous analytical strategy to such forms of PPP projects such as striking 
commendable balance between risk and return when carrying out ethical evaluation of 
PPPs disregarded the institutional and ethical impacts and further suggested that future 
procurement of food and health PPP projects should take into consideration the 
limitations of parties involved in the contract. 
 Some benefits of PPPs have been highlighted in the introduction. HM Treasury 
(1993) underlined another major rationale behind PPP arrangement, namely, an 
opportunity to utilize the efficiency and management proficiency of the private sector. 
 Particularly for construction industries, the required set of skills for PPP projects 
has been observed to have lasting value-added impact on the development of the 
industry, and that the accompanying challenges of PPP projects demand a considerable 
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level of attention to avoid eliminating the benefits derived from such projects (Anvuur 
and Kumaraswamy, 2006). 
3. Methodology 
 This section reviews the participation of the private sector in the provision of 
public amenities in Nigeria using the methodology of traditional literature review. 
3.1 Private sector participation in the provision of public amenities in 
Nigeria 
 Nigeria has remained the largest economy in Africa since 2014, with are based 
GDP of 568,508 million US dollars. Despite this, infrastructure constraints has remained 
a major factor limiting foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria (World Bank, 2015). 
 Sanusi (2012) stated that approximately 10 billion US dollars per annum is 
required to combat the infrastructure need of the country. To achieve this, the country 
which currently allocates only 7 per cent of its annual GDP to infrastructure 
development will have to increase this proportion to approximately 12 per cent. 
 The public sector of the Nigerian economy had been fully developed by the 
1970s and 1980s following the nation‘s independence from the colonial rule. The public 
sector of the country covers basic sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, 
telecommunication amongst others. In 2011, there were over 1500 public enterprises in 
Nigeria. These enterprises accounted for 50-60 percent of employment and 30-40 
percent of total fixed capital investment. However, the yields from these huge 
investments were meagre and sometimes negative. For instance, in the power sector, 
additional costs of power generation imposed by the National Electric Power Authority 
(NEPA), now the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) on the economy was 
estimated at thirteen billion US dollars annually. This had adverse effect on the entry of 
private operators that could probably be more effective (World Bank, 2011). 
 Although the NigerianGovernment had approved its privatisation program since 
1999 in the initial construction of canals and railways, the public-private 
partnershiparrangement was not formalised until almost a decade laterr(World Bank, 
2011).   
 In Nigeria, the PPP approach of financing infrastructure was fully formalised 
barely six years ago as a unit in the country‘s Infrastructure Concession Regulatory 
Commission (ICRC). The panel which was enacted by an act of 2005 takes guardianship 
of concession contract entered into by the Federal Government and also ensures 
effectiveness of such contract. Meanwhile, the office of the Auditor-General of the 
federation is tasked with the responsibilty of financial accountability of PPP programmes 
in the country (Okaro and Okafor, 2011). 
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 Nigeria adopts the UK‘sPPP model, which includes Design Build Finance Operate 
(DBFO), the most widely employed PPP model,wherby the private partner sets out to 
design, construct, fund and maintain the project for the stipulated  period of the 
contract(Kwak, et al., 2009).  
 According to the Federal Government of Nigeria, PPP is anticipated to cover 
implementation of new infrastructure and renovation of existing assets in the following 
federal facilities:power generation and power transmission/distribution networks, roads 
and bridges, ports, railways, inland container depots and logistics hubs, gas and 
petroleum infrastructures, such as storage depots and distribution pipelines, water 
supply, treatment and distribution systems, solid waste management, schools, urban 
transport systems, housing and healthcare. However, implementation of PPP projects 
are not limited to the federal level. State Governments are also allowed to embark on 
PPP projects, but with a support of guarantee by the Federal Government. A support of 
guarantee can include the federal government‘s persuasion to the financial markets to 
lend to the proposed projects(ICRC, 2015). 
 Although almost all required infrastructure for a nation‘s economic growth have 
been highlighted as facilities that can be established via PPP in Nigeria, it is deemed 
necessary to investigate to what extent PPP practices have been validated in the 
country andwhether  there are any successful PPP projects that have been 
accomplished in the country.  
 Public-private partnership scheme has been formalised in Nigeria‘s health care 
system. However, little or nothing can be said to have been established in the form of 
validation and implementation. This non-validation might have discouraged the private 
sector over the years. The meagre participation of private partners in the health sector 
has been attributed to the inability of policy makers to design policies that match 
domestic challenges (Anyaehie, et al., 2014). Other limitations of PPP in the public 
sector will be discussed in section 4. 
 Research shows that Nigeria has limited experience in PPPs. The most successful 
story of PPP in Nigeria is recorded in the transportation sector, which is a ports facility. 
The recently completed Murtala Mohammed Domestic Airport (MMA2) was succesfully 
completed using the PPP scheme. The project which was a redevelopment arrangement 
was awarded to Bi-courtney Aviation Services Limited in 2003,  before the full 
formalisation of a PPP unit in the country‘s Independent Concession Regualatory 
Commission. The commitment of the Federal Government of Nigeria to PPP scheme can 
be highlighted in its decision to change its contractor when the initial private partner of 
the project (MMA2) did not make any attemptwithin the first six months. The domestic 
airport was built under the build operate transfer model. Four years after the contract 
was awarded, the facility was commissioned and started full operation  a month later, 
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on the 7th of May 2007. The project which was initially awarded for twelve years have 
been extended to 36 years(ICRC, 2015). 
 The concession model used for this successful huge PPP project in Nigeria is 
based on the following model: 
Figure 3.1.1: A PPP concession model 
 
Source: ICRC (2015) 
 Figure 3.1.3 above shows that the concessionaire (private sector) recovers the 
costs of construction directly from consumers in the form of user fees as is common in 
somePPP projects. The concessionaire can be observed to be sitting equally between 
both the consumers and the government. Lenders are only associated with the 
concessionaire, while the private partner is expected to report to the government and 
the government is equally answerable to the private partner in keeping its own part of 
the contract. Tariffs setting are usually carried out prior to the start of the project. This 
major success story of PPP in Nigeria is consistent with the conclusion of Anvuur and 
Kumaraswamy (2006) who state that most developing countries succeed mainly with 
first generation PPP projects. 
 Another successful PPP project in the transport sector is the design-build-
operate-transfer concession for the 49km Lekki expressway constructed on the Lagos 
Island, Lagos State Nigeria. 
 In the past, PPP have also been employed in the construction of a number of 
power stations. The Mambilla and Zungeru hydro stations were also developed with the 
participation of the private sector. Power distribution and transmisison have also been 
constructed under the management contract of PPP(NEEDS, 2004). However, these 
only occurred in very few areas of the country. 
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 Besides the major success of the ports facility and the aforementioned projects, 
a good number of PPP projects are currently being constructed and established in 
Nigeria. Table 1 shows the ongoing PPP projects in the country. Currently, the World 
Bank has a number of PPP programme in Nigeria.  
 As highlighted in the introduction, PPP adopts several models.In Nigeria there is 
no one particular specific model being employed in implementing projects. Individual 
PPP projects are carried out using various preffered models.Abbreviationsused in table 1 
below are represented as follows: BT- Build Transfer, BOT- Build Own Transfer, BOOT- 
Build Own Operate Transfer,BOO- Build Own Operate and TCN Transmission Company 
of Nigeria. 
Table 1Ongoing PPP Projects in Nigeria 
 
Ongoing PPP Projects in Nigeria 
S/N PROJECT PHASE & 
PROPOSED MODEL 
MINISTRIES 
DEVELOPMENT & 
AGENCIES 
1 PPP High Voltage Transmission for 
TCN(a) 
Development/ 
Procurement & BT 
TCN 
2 PPP High Voltage Transmission for 
TCN (b) 
BT TCN 
3 PPP High Voltage Transmission for 
TCN (c) 
BT, BOT, BOOT, BOO TCN 
4 PPP High Voltage Transmission for 
TCN (d) 
BT, BOT, BOOT, BOO TCN 
5 PPP High Voltage Transmission for 
TCN (e) 
BT, BOT, BOOT, BOO TCN 
6 PPP High Voltage Transmission for 
TCN (f) 
BT, BOT, BOOT, BOO TCN 
7 Concession of the Multi-Purpose 
Components of the Gurara 1 Dam 
Operate and Maintain 
& Development phase 
Federal Ministry of Water 
Resources 
8 Bakalori Irrigation Project Rehabilitate, Operate 
and Maintain/ 
Development Phase 
Federal Ministry of Water 
Resources 
9 Jibiya Irrigation Project Development Phase Federal Ministry of Water 
Resources 
10 Middle Rima Valley Irrigation Development Phase Federal Ministry of Water 
Resources 
11 Dasin Hausa Dam Development Phase Federal Ministry of Water 
Resources 
12 Elele Prison Farm Development Phase Federal Ministry of Water 
Resources 
13 Tede Dam  Development Phase Federal Ministry of Water 
Resources 
14 Peremabiri Irrigation and Land 
reclamation 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Water 
Resources 
15 Owena Multi-purpose Dam Water 
Supply 
Development Phase  Federal Ministry of Water 
Resources 
16 Development of the Marina Car Park 
and the Marina Water front 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Lands, 
Housing and Urban 
Development  
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17 Redevelopment of the Miinistry‘s 
Land on St. Gregory Road, Onikan-
Ikoyi, Lagos 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Lands, 
Housing and Urban 
Development 
18 Development of Ministry‘s Land 
behind the National Stadium, 
Surulere, Lagos 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Lands, 
Housing and Urban 
Development 
19 Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and 
Expansion of Lagos-Ibadan Dual 
Carriageway 
Procurement Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
20 Construction of a Bridge over River 
Niger at Nupeko, Niger State 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
21 Bodo Bonny road with a bridge 
across Opobo channel to the Island 
of Bonny in Rivers State 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
22 Keffi-Akwanga-Lafia-Makurdi Road 
(Nassarrawa and Benue States) 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
23 Lokoja-Ajakuta-Ogbulafo-9th Mile 
Road 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
24 Akwanga-Jos Road Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
25 Dualisation of Enugu (9th mile)-
Otukpa-Lokoja 
BOT & Development 
Phase 
Federal Ministry of Works 
26 Phase 1: 2ndLagos outer ring Road; 
Tin Can Island-Igando-Lagos/Otta 
road interchange-Lagos/Ibadan 
expressway 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
27 Phase 2: 2nd Lagos outer ring Road; 
Lekki-Ikorodu Shagamu/ Benin 
Expressway 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
28 Abuja-Kaduna-Kano Dual 
Carriageway 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
29 Lagos-Badagry-Seme Border 
Expressway 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
30 Shagamu-Benin-Asaba Expressway Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
31 River Benue Bridge @ Ibi, Taraba 
state 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Works 
32 Ibom Deepsea Port Development Phase Federal Ministry of 
Transport, Nigerian Ports 
Authority and Akwa Ibom 
State Government 
33 Inland Container Depot, Gombe Development Phase Federal Ministry of 
Transport and Nigerian 
Shipper‘s Council 
34 Greenfield Highspeed Land Railway 
Lines across Nigeria 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of 
Transport 
35 Development of 23 Industrial 
Development Centres Across 
Nigeria 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Trade & 
Industry (Small and 
Medium Enterprises 
Development Agency) 
36 National Trade and International 
Business Centre Project. 
  
 
Development Phase Fed. Ministry of Trade and 
Investment (Tafawa 
Balewa Square 
Management Board) 
37 National Stadium Lagos Development Phase National Sports 
Commission 
38 National Stadium Athletes Hostel, 
Abuja 
Development Phase National Sports 
Commission 
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39 Calabar-Kano Gas Pipeline Development Phase Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources/ 
NNPC 
40 National Theatre Masterplan 
Complementary Facilities 
Realization 
Development Phase Federal Ministry of Culture, 
Tourism and National 
Orientation/National 
Theatre Management 
41 Abuja Medical Mall Development Phase Federal Ministry of Health 
42 Development of Mechanic Villages Development Phase Fed. Ministry of Trade and 
Investment (National 
Automotive Council) 
43 Establishment of a Multimedia 
Centre in the FCT 
Development Phase Nigerian Film Corporation 
44 Development of Film Screening 
Theatres  
Development Phase Nigerian Film Corporation 
45 Upgrade of the Corporation‘s Lagos 
Office Studio and Mini Theatre for 
Commercial Purposes 
Development Phase Nigerian Film Corporation 
46 The Establishment and Take-off of 
the Film Industry Complex 
Development Phase Nigerian Film Corporation 
47 Upgrading of Auditorium to 
International Screening Standard at 
NFI 
Development Phase Nigerian Film Corporation 
48 Establishment of 3 Film Villages at 
Miango Plateau State for which 400 
hectares of land have been set 
aside at Akwa Ibom and Ibadan. 
Development Phase Nigerian Film Corporation 
 Data Source: ICRC (2015) 
 A close observation of table 1 shows that the country had been embarking on 
approximately fifty PPP projects as at 2014. Most of these ongoing PPP projects are in 
the development phase; this shows the country‘s commitments to the public-private 
partnership approach of infrastructure financing. The list covers a sizable number of 
facilities which are needed for the nation‘s growth, ranging from sports, housing, urban 
transport systems, amongst many others. 
 The ICRC (2015) on the 17th of August 2015 reported the University of Abuja 
governing boards‘ intentions to construct hostels and ancillary facilities via the PPP 
scheme. This is still at the embryo stage and not much is known about the 
commencement of the project. It can be adjudged that PPP financing is permeating into 
the education sector of Nigeria. 
 The following section discusses the limitations of PPPs in the Nigeria economy, 
probable reasons why PPP projects have not been fully established in the country. 
 4. Discussion of Findings 
 4.1 Limitations of PPPs in Developing Economies 
 
 Earlier discussions in this study underlined that there has been a drag in the 
validation of PPPs in most developing economies, and the reasons behind these, if not 
given considerable attention may hike up the cost of PPP projects over the benefits 
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therein, especially for developing countries that have found it quite difficult to 
implement in most cases. This section examines the limitations of PPP in developing 
countries, with some attention being given to Nigeria, the developing country taken for 
this case study. 
 One trend in the PPP arrangement in developing economies is the idea of 
splitting up large infrastructure projects into smaller portions which can allow for 
participation by small scale contractors (Ng and Loosemore, 2007). Hall (1998) 
criticized such strategy as a result of the associated risk: mangling of public sector 
priorities, which implies that only projects that can survive through such framework will 
be considered for  public-private partnership arrangements.  
 The challenges of PPP in developing countries, the subject of this section will be 
discussed under three subheadings: institutional corruption, poor risk management and 
complex nature of PPPs. 
 1) Institutional Corruption 
 Marks (2013) described institutional corruption as organizational practices which 
pose concern about the credibility of an organization or system and consequently about 
the reliability of the same institution. He emphasized that although the subject of 
institutional corruption is applicable to both the public and private sectors, it is a more 
significant in terms of the public sector. 
 Ogbeidi (2012) established that a major contributory factor to the slack in 
economic development in Nigeria is the phenomenon of corruption.  
 The outcome of institutional corruption observed in most developing countries‘ 
PPP is generally the lack of trust, which marks the subject of corruption. Both parties 
involved in the contract lack significant measures of confidence in the other party, that 
is the public sector on the one hand believes that even in a traditional model of 
infrastructure construction,  projects are often contracted out to the private sector who 
does not only deliver less quality projects but also fails to be accountable, while the 
private sector also distrusts the public sector who finds it difficult to keep economic risk 
such as inflation amongst others low over the years. 
 The inadequacies of institutional integrity cannot be said to be only applicable to 
developing countries but also to the developed countries as well. For instance, in the 
case of Dairy Management Inc. (DMI), in the USA in 2010, a PPP arrangement was 
found to have covertly involved services of some fast food suppliers to increase 
drastically the level of cheese in the menu items (Marks, 2013). 
 However, it is not an understatement to submit that the level of corruptionin 
most developing countries is grave when compared to the developed countries. 
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          2) Poor Risk Management 
 Heravi, et al. (2012) agree that the level of risk involved in public-private 
partnership schemes is totally different from those posed by the traditional model of 
procuring infrastructure. 
 The World Bank highlighted inappropriate risk administration as a bane to 
successful PPP infrastructure projects (Zhang, 2005). Examples of PPP projects in 
developing countries which were delayed as a result of poor risk management includes, 
Guangzhan-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Superhighway in China and the improvement and 
remodeling of Malaysia‘s sewer systems, a 28-year concession arrangement (Ng and 
Loosemore, 2007; Abdul-Aziz, 2001). Also, currently bearing high level of risk is the 
Queen Mamohato Memorial Hospital in Lesotho, which is sustained by half of the 
country‘s health budgets, invariably diverting a huge fraction of public funds for its 
maintenance. This agreement is expected to last until 2027 (Romero, 2015).  
Under the subject of poor risk administration, risks can be classified as follows:  
 a) Political Risk 
 In as much as political support is germane in achieving successful PPP projects, 
on the other hand, political risk is found to be a constraint to positive outcomes of PPP 
projects. Political risk involves possible cessation of PPP contracts by the government, 
abrupt amendment to law or legislation guiding the public and private sector practices. 
Although political events have led to termination of concessions in the past, future 
concession agreements still do not contain compensation arrangements for early 
terminations (Heravi, et al., 2012). Expectedly, potential investors can be discouraged 
as the outcome of such risk is unplanned costs. 
 Most developing countries are marked by political instability. Nigeria was 
reported to have had the most free and fair election ever in its history in March 2015, 
besides the 1999 elections after 54 years of independence from colonial rule. This is 
evidenced in (Tignor, 1993)the historical examination of political corruption in Nigeria. 
Governance in Nigeria is known for continual sentiments. New political regime has been 
observed to abandon projects already signed into contracts by previous leaders. 
Another sentiment portrayed by different political administrations is making negatively 
significant changes to past projects. An example of abandoned project by leaderships in 
Nigeria is the River Niger Bridge at Nupeko, a bridge intended to connect communities 
between Niger State and Kwara State. However, this project is now to be completed 
under PPP scheme (ICRC, 2015).      
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 b) Financial Risk 
 Financial risk basically takes the form of limited funding. Inaccurate prediction of 
rate of inflation can increase project costs. Besides, initial budget sometimes does not 
include possible environmental concerns which can result in limited project financing 
(Heravi, et al., 2012).  
 In Nigeria, a major example is the recently completed Murtala Mohammed 
Airport, Lagos Domestic Terminal. The project was estimated to require 200 million US 
dollars. The private partner initially obtained support from a single financial institution, 
this made the project neck breaking.However, four years later, five other financial 
institutions joined in the support, and this led to the full completion of the project 
(ICRC, 2015). 
 Also, in the Nigerian healthcare sector, one major limitation of PPP is the risk of 
cost. The government of Nigeria is known to charge low user fees for access to health 
facilities, and at some other times free health care is declared. However, the free 
healthcare system in Nigeria has produced poor health delivery services, as a result of 
negligence in the maintenance of health facilities. Hence, those who are rich prefer to 
use private healthcare facilities. Nonetheless the majority of the masses cannot afford 
expensive costs of healthcare. Since private sectors are profit oriented, the health 
sector in Nigeria may be a difficult industry to fully participate in by merely following 
superficial policies. This is because revenue to cover the private partner‘s costs may not 
be easily obtainable (Anyaehie, et al., 2014).    
 Another record of financial constraints in PPP arrangements in a developing 
country is the Tehran-Chalus Toll Road project, one of the largest highway project 
constructed in Iran (Heravi, et al., 2012).   
 Limited financing for infrastructure projects has always been known to have 
pernicious effects on the completion of such projects. 
 c) Construction Risk 
 One aspect of construction risk for most developing countries is inadequate land 
acquisition or delayed land procurement for PPP projects, which is often shouldered as 
the public sector responsibility under PPP arrangements. PPP schemes also neglect 
environmental approval in some cases, such as in road constructions, where failure to 
procure approval for road alignment may impede the on-time completion of the 
projects(Heravi, et al., 2012). 
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3) Complex Nature of PPPs 
 
 Romero (2015) highlighted that PPPs have failed under many circumstances due 
to the complexity involved in such projects which have led to several renegotiations in 
the past and even recently. Such renegotiations usually come with significant costs to 
the public partner. Statistics reveals that on an average, approximately 55 per cent of 
PPP projects are renegotiated every two years, the resulting consequences are increase 
in tariffs, which is observed in 62 per cent of the renegotiations. However, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) states that these rework-out often have positive 
effects on the private partner. Since PPP is a contract between two major stakeholders 
(Public sector and Private Partners), the additional costs to the public sector, the 
originator of PPP infrastructure projects cannot be neglected. 
 Furthermore, the complex nature of PPP projects explains their need for special 
and specific skills, as well as steep learning curve. These exceptional requirements for 
successful PPP projects distort the growth of a sustainable PPP environment (Akintoye, 
et al., 2005). 
 Anvuur and Kumaraswamy (2006) gave an example of ‗catch-22‘ paradox which 
restricts local contractors‘ participation because of their lack of experience. Just like 
graduate trainees not being hired, they may never have job experience, thus similarly, 
these local contractors may not have the expected sufficient track record to embark on 
a PPP project if they are not given the opportunity to participate in the first instance.     
 The UK is widely acclaimed as the most successful country in the use of PPPs in 
establishing infrastructure. The next section will primarily focus on the critical factors 
behind the established success stories of the UK. 
 4.2 Critical Success Factors for PPPs in the UK 
 Following the 2007/2008 global financial crises, there has been a marked 
increase in the use of PPP by governments worldwide, especially in Europe (Osei-Kyei 
and Chan, 2015).Public-private partnership in the United Kingdom was formalized in 
1992, following the introduction of PFIs (Li, et al., 2005). In terms of public-private 
partnership approach of financing infrastructures, the United Kingdom is adjudged the 
most outstanding nation in this regard (Chou and Pramudawardhani, 2015). By the 
year 2002, the fraction of the UK government‘s budget assigned to PPP programmes 
was as much as 11 per cent (Brown, 1999).As a result, in the year 2013, the United 
Kingdom already recorded over 600 PPPs under the PFI modal, which in monetary 
terms is equivalent to 100 billion US dollars ‗for hospitals, schools, prisons, bridges, 
roads and military equipment‘(Roehrich, et al., 2014).  
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 Evidence of early success stories of PPPs in the United Kingdom in terms of cost 
savings are portrayed in figure 3.2.1 below. 
Figure 3.2.1: Cost savings on some early UK PPP project 
 
 
    Data Source: HM Treasury (1997) 
  
 A research conducted by Navarro-Espigares and Martı´n-Segura (2011) also 
confirms a positively and statistically significant relationship between economic effect 
and PPPinfrastructure projects in the UK.Generally, aPPP project entails the following 
phases, ‗planning, procurement, and contract management‘ (Bing, et al., 2005). The 
planning phase involves the development of a business case for the intended project; a 
business case represents the commercial justification for embarking on a project, which 
involves feasibility as well as cost-benefit analysis of the project. The procurement 
stage begins with advertising, (in the UK this is publicized in the Official Journal of 
European Community; (OJEC)), shortlisted bidders are sent invitations to negotiate 
(ITN) - a tender document which contains instructions, proposed contractual period and 
risk matrix amongst other components. The most suited bidder is selected based on 
‗best and final offer‘ (BAFO) after which the contract management begins (Bing, et al., 
2005).    
 
 In the UK, healthcare delivery receives considerable level of attention from PFI 
(Navarro-Espigares and Martı´n-Segura, 2011).For instance, in England, the 
Responsibility Deal (RD) of the public health sector which was launched in March 2011 
is solely a public-private partnership arrangement. The arrangement also involves 
voluntary contracts by several businesses. As at January 2015, 753 organizations had 
signed up at least one of the RD pledges. This has helped in achieving availability and 
access to primary healthcare and products as well improving cooperation with the 
authority on health issues (Cécile Knai, et al., 2015). 
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 The impact of PPP in the healthcare sector of the United Kingdom can be 
appraised, considering its minimal contribution towards reducing the level of addiction 
of its citizens to alcohol, although there are arguments regarding the validity of this 
conclusion. It is observed that recent leadership of the country gives less consideration 
to industry interest when establishing policies around addictive food substance (Cécile 
Knai, et al., 2015).      
 There are of course several critical driving factors responsible for the success the 
United Kingdom have been able to record in its PPP scheme. Rockart, (1982) defined 
critical success factors as the key areas of operations where optimum outcomes are 
required so that managerial goals can be achieved (Rockart, 1982).  
 The critical success factors behind the UK success story in PPPs which is the 
major rationale behind this study are discussed in turn. 
          1) Apt Risk Allocation and Sharing 
 Risk allocation in PPP schemes involves allotment of risks between parties 
directly involved (Bing, et al., 2005). In the UK, the strategy behind effective allocation 
of risk is given quality attention. The UK risk allocation design leaves out end users in 
risk sharing. Risk involved in each stage of the project delivery, probability of 
occurrence and accompanying commercial consequences are documented in a register. 
The initial risk sharing structure is communicated in the invitation to negotiate (ITN). 
Interested private partners then assess the cost of risk management and subsequently 
set a bid price which may be accepted or rejected by the public sector after careful 
consideration of profitability measures, such as the net present value amongst others 
(Bing, et al., 2005). Successful PPP requires the understanding of risk sharing in 
allocating risk, while extra caution is taken to avoid diverting excess risks to the private 
sector (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015). 
 The UK employs the following risk classification; macro, messo and micro level 
risks, as categorized by Li (2003). The public sector is expected to withhold risk which 
the private partner is incapable of bearing.  
 In their survey, Bing, et al. (2005) highlighted the following risks as befitting of 
the UK government, ‗nationalization/expropriation, poor political decision-making 
process, political opposition, and site availability and government stability‘. On the 
other hand, they listed the following risks to be allocated to the private sector, ‗tax 
regulation change, late design changes, residual risk, inflation, the tradition of private 
sector provision of public services, staff crisis, third party tort liability, influential 
economic events, the financial attraction of the project, the level of demand for the 
project, and different working methods‘ (Bing, et al., 2005). A number of other risks 
were defined as risks to be shared between the involved parties, including: ‗force 
majeure and legislation change, lack of commitment from a partner, responsibilities and 
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risk distribution and authority distribution between partnerships‘.  In this way, the 
British government has been able to encourage more participation by the private sector 
in procuring infrastructure. 
 2) Quality Private Consortium 
 Another rationale behind the UK‘s PPP success story is the country‘s ability to 
incorporate strong private consortium. Since most PPP projects are capital and labour 
intensive, the UK government, as much as possible avoids entering into concessions or 
agreements with a single construction firm (where applicable). The government 
encourages pulling together of assets by interested private partners, such that a 
consortium is formed (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015). In achieving a strong consortium, 
two germane factors are required; mechanical and financial strength of interested 
investors (Zhang, 2005). Another strategy of the government in achieving the desired 
results in this area is to investigate the compatibility of the group of firms that makes 
up the consortium. In this way, the risk of failed PPP projects can be reduced (Osei-Kyei 
and Chan, 2015). 
 3) Economic Viability 
 Zhang (2005) highlighted the significance of economic workability in achieving 
successful PPP projects. The discussion on the commercial viability of a nation revolves 
around some conditions, including continuous demand and relevance of the public 
goods and services provided by PPP projects, less competition from other resource-
demanding projects, considerable measure of profitability to fascinate investors, long-
lasting returns that will be appealing enough to investors and lastly, continuous 
availability of suppliers required for the running of the project. Most of these listed 
conditions have been met by the British government. PPP projects embarked upon by 
the UK government are found to have delivered long-run public services to citizens, for 
example design-build-transfer-operate roads constructed in the early 1990s are still 
very much in use by the society.     
 4) Political support 
 There are strong relationships between PPP which is a public policy and the 
political atmosphere of the host community (Li, et al., 2005b). Expectedly, public 
expenditure of public projects demands appropriate consent from relevant political 
leaders (Jacobson and Choi, 2008). Besides, international investors are also known to 
have natural proclivity for economies that have sufficient political support. The OECD 
(2008) equates poor political support to high political risk, which results in limited 
competition in the tendering procedure. For instance, Bing, et al. (2005) opined that 
political stability experienced in the contemporary British government has sustained PPP 
projects in the country especially in terms of construction projects. Consequently, the 
increased in the number of PPP projects in the United Kingdom can be explained partly 
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by the country‘s impressive political support and approval for PPP schemes as 
confirmed by Hardcastle, at al. (2005). 
  
 5) Public Support 
 In ensuring the success of PPP programmes in a community, a required level of 
community support and understanding must be obtained. The impact of the Britons‘ 
awareness and acceptability of PPP projects is not only observed in the increasing 
number of tenders by private investors but also in the marked participation of voluntary 
organizations. For instance, in the responsibility deal (RD) of the public health sector, 
the number of voluntary partners that have sworn at least one pledge has increased 
over the years (Cécile Knai, et al., 2015).    
 Political support also enhances good administration of the procurement process 
(Helmy, 2011). However, the OECD (2010) emphasized the need for the government‘s 
reassurance to the public by delivering standard public services and charging 
considerable end user fees for PPP financed infrastructure. 
 6) Transparent Procurement 
 The United Kingdom continuously strives to achieve transparency in its Private 
Finance Initiatives right from the tendering process to the delivery of the infrastructure. 
Effective procurement is germane to the realization of a PPP investment, because it 
ensures supervision, analysis, inspection and informed stakeholders‘ decisions 
throughout the process, and that transparency in the procurement stage enhances the 
value for money for the public partner (Helmy, 2011).  To achieve such objectives, 
clarity and speed, as much as good contract administration are necessary (Hodge, et 
al., 2010). Siemiatycki and Farooqi (2012) in their discussion  on the subject of 
transparency under value for money also examined the subject in terms of risk 
administration.   
 Mukhopadhyay (2015) also stressed that transparency is a two-way 
communication model, which includes: stakeholders‘ commitment throughout the 
project design and development by maintaining a feedback design as well as public 
involvement such as press reports amongst others.   
 The UK strives to achieve this by ensuring communication between the UK public 
sector and the private partners. This is underlined in the UK government‘s initiation of 
the PFI/PF2 tracker, which is a tool to emphasize transparency and achieve improved 
accountability of the private partners (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2013).  
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 7) Thorough Research on PPP 
 Ke, et al.(2010) confirmed that since the past decades, a considerable level of 
concentration has been dedicated on research regarding the success factors of PPP. 
 One reason behind the success of PPP in the UK can be adjudged as the depth of 
research being carried out in the country on the subject. Roehrich, et al. (2014) 
examined the level of empirical investigations that have been done on PPP around the 
world. The figure below shows their findings. It is obvious from figure 5 that the UK is 
the country in the world with the second highest number of publications on PPP. 
Figure 5: Number of PPP research publications globally (in excess of nine publications) 
 
Source: Roehrich, et al. (2014) 
  
 The UK‘s conscious effort in carrying out increasing research on PPPs has been 
observed to have positively impact on the number of established PPP projects over the 
years (HM Treasury and Infrastructure U.K., 2013). Not only is the UK being rankedhigh 
in research on PPP, the country is also committed to research on the critical success 
factors for PPP.  
  
 Figure 6 below portrays the number of published papers on the critical success 
factors for PPP in countries that have carried out such research.  
  
53 
International Journal of Business and Economics 
Vol. 4, No. 1, 2019, pp. 33-62 
http://ijbe.ielas.org/index.php/ijbe/index                                                                                                                                               
ISSN (online) 2545-4137 
  
 
Figure 6: Number of published papers on critical success factors for PPP globally, 1900-2013 
 
 Source: Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) 
 Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) carried out a research on the number of publications 
on PPP CSFs for the period, 1900-2013. They based their research on 52 published 
journals for which search engines assumed have published on PPP CSFs. While the UK 
is observed to have three publications, Nigeria is observed to have had only one paper 
in which PPP CSF is discussed with the country in view. This gap is not wide, and as a 
result, this can be interpreted as growing interest of Nigerian researchers on the 
success factors for PPPs. 
 4.3 Recommended Policies and Institutions to Developing Economies to 
Achieve Successful PPPs 
 Connecting the missing links of PPP arrangements apparently have potential 
value on poor developing countries (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2006). Risk allocation 
lessons can be learnt by the Nigerian government from the British risk assignment 
mechanism. All the five major risks assigned to the public sector of the UK government 
fit into the Nigerian government. For instance, just as in the UK system, the Nigerian 
government also retains legal authority of making available required land.    
 In bridging the gap in strong private consortium, the Nigerian government needs 
to intensify support for local firms, both commercially and technically, to strengthen 
their capability in competing with international project firms for both the domestic and 
global PPP projects. This suggested that aids from the government is not expected to 
be made available just-in-time of a proposed PPP project but should be gradually 
incorporated into the economic environment in which the local firms operate in.    
 In mitigating political risk, the government of Nigeria will have to improve its 
approach of enforcing legislations. Politics in Nigeria comes with great sentiments from 
political parties that discourage continuation of set processes and procedures. Hence, 
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political administrators in Nigeria will have to win back the trust of the private sector by 
remaining bound to contracts and agreements already approved, irrespective of 
changes in leadership.  
 In section three, the significance of a pellucid procurement process of PPP 
projects was highlighted. To achieve better PPP scheme in Nigeria, the government will 
have to put in more effort to obtain investors‘ confidence by operating a constant and 
open communication line. Not only is transparency required of the public sector but also 
of the private partners involved in the PPP arrangement. This is necessary in combating 
the limitation of corruption which marks most developing countries. Mukhopadhyay 
(2015) opined that effective transparency can reduce the corruption rate of a 
community. The more information revealed the less that both the public and private 
sectors can hide without being traced back to previous press releases. Although 
Mukhopadhyay (2015) argued that the absence of transparency is more evident in the 
traditional model of infrastructure finance. For instance, in the traditional model, 
contracts are given out to the private sector that does not have to take responsibility 
for the maintenance risk, unlike in the PPP model. However, the implications for PPP 
models seem to be graver than in the traditional model. Hence a need to ensure 
effective transparency to achieve better PPP projects,    
 The government will also need to correct any negative impression held by the 
communities concerning the delivery of PPP projects. The next few paragraphs will take 
the Nigerian health sector as a case study to discuss how the large PPP gaps can be 
bridged in Nigeria.  
 The extent of PPPs in the health sector of Nigeria has been discussed and the 
limitations to its success have also been highlighted. However, there are many policies 
and actions that can be put in place towards the implementation of PPP in the health 
sector. Anyaehie, et al. (2014) suggests that colossal level of awareness would go a 
long way to achieve more private partnerships in the health sector. Also, an increase in 
stakeholders‘ (public and private) involvements and a better structured policy prior to 
implementation are other helpful recommendations. 
 In a more practical sense, the best fit PPP contract type for Nigeria‘s health 
sector is the service contract. A service contract is a type of PPP arrangement in which 
the government employs the private partner to carry out certain services for a period, 
usually one to three years (ICRC, 2015). 
 This is a recommended PPP approach for the health sector in Nigeria, whereby 
the public sector is still the major provider of health facilities, but fractions of its 
operations are out-sourced to the private sector. The rationale behind this 
recommendation is that risk associated with funding, which includes maintenance and 
refurbishing that may have discouraged private partners in the past is now solely borne 
by the government, meanwhile practitioners involved in delivering healthcare are from 
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the private partners. Another advantage of the above recommendation is that the 
service contract is known for its short-life. As a result, performance can be measured, 
and if value for money is observed, the contract can be extended. This approach is best 
employed by piecemeal, considering the sensitive nature of the healthcare sector.   
 Finally, under the discussion of the recommended PPP method for the health 
sector of Nigeria, service contract is preferred for some portion of health care delivery 
and not management or concession contract following the findings of Liebe and Pollock 
(2009) who stated that these other forms of contract actually afford lesser value for 
money when compared to non-private finance initiatives health care facilities. 
 In combating PPP limitations in developing countries, Albouy and Bousba (1998) 
suggest reduction of transaction costs by standardizing relevant documents. In the 
opinion of Jechoutek and Lamech (1995), this can only be achieved by attending to 
subordinated debt and certain equity portions of the project with better and larger 
balance sheet back-up. For instance, to address the cost of senior debts in PPP projects 
in the health sector, the UK government initiated ‗credit guarantee finance‘ under the 
2003 Treasury Initiative, which aid access to funding by creditworthy companies in the 
presence of restriction to such access because of inadequate credit information. In 
addition, the Standard PFI contract documentation (SoPC version 3) mandated in the 
UK (HM Treasury, 2004) is a way of standardizing documents which reduces the 
transaction costs as much as possible (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2006). 
 Conclusively, the decision of whether a project should be executed under a PPP 
arrangement depends on the commercial capability and the value of public gains it 
brings along (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2006). To bridge the conspicuous gap of PPP 
financing approach in Nigeria, the Nigerian government, while considering the measure 
of risk associated to a PPP project should weigh the extent to which the society will 
benefit from the public service. If this is given adequate consideration, there are 
tendencies that many infrastructures demanded by the society will be provided, and 
subsequently economic development is achieved.  
  5. Conclusion  
 This paper established a discussion about public-private partnership, the 
situation in a developed economy and a developing economy. Concisely, the United 
Kingdom was taken as a developed economy for case study with its more than 23 years 
of PPP implementation in the form of PFIs. On the other hand, Nigeria, the largest 
country in Africa was chosen as a case study of a developing country.  
 The concept of PPP was introduced at the early stage of the study, whereby the 
two generations (first and second) as classified by scholars were discussed. Also, 
emphasis was laid on the two forms of PPP, which are contract and scheme. Contract 
PPPs includes lease, service, management and concession. Risk sharing and value for 
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money were underlined as the hallmark of all PPPs, especially those of the second 
generation. In addition, the benefits of PPPs were discussed, including its ability to 
reduce the large up-front costs required in delivering public services.   
 Section one of this research briefly reviewed some literature background of PPPs, 
the successes and failures in some part of the world in general. Also, being reviewed 
are earlier researches about the differences in PPP driving factors, CSFs, and risk 
allocation in some selected countries, including the UK. 
 Section two investigated to what extent PPP is practiced in Nigeria. About 10 
physical projects were observed to have been completed through a full PPP scheme 
since the formalization of PPP in 2005 as a unit under the country‘s ICRC. Other current 
(uncompleted) PPP projects were listed, with approximately 50 ongoing PPP projects. 
 This can be interpreted as a future hope for the Nigerian economy in terms of 
PPP infrastructure financing approach. 
 Section three subsequently examined some of the limitations of PPPs in 
developing countries with a considerable level of attention being given to Nigeria. The 
major limitations highlighted includes: institutional corruption, poor risk management, 
and the complex nature of PPPs. Following this discussion, section four considers the 
critical strength in UK‘s PFI programme, where the following were highlighted: apt risk 
allocation and sharing, quality private consortium, economic viability, political support, 
public support, transparent procurement and thorough research regarding PPP.  
 Finally, recommendations were given regarding what policies and institutions 
that can be put in place by the Nigeria economy to close the gap observed in the 
nation‘s drag in PPP practice. One of the lessons to be learnt by the Nigerian 
government is the segmentation of risks associated with PPP, namely macro, messo, 
and micro risk levels, as adopted in the UK. Lessons about the use of strong private 
consortium, which is more applicable in the Nigerian economy, where most individual 
contractors are adjudged as having insufficient track record of carrying out a PPP 
project. In addition, compatibility of private partners who formed the consortium should 
be considered. Elevated level of risk associated with PPP projects in developing 
countries can be combated by enforcing legislation, such as a change in political 
leadership would not terminate already approved contracts. Besides, Invitation to 
Negotiate (ITN) should also contain compensation plans in case of termination due to 
political change.   
 One major challenge of this research is the limited information on PPP in the 
Nigerian economy. It was quite challenging to get reliable data in this regard. 
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